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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 
 Pursuant to Federal Circuit Rule 47.5, appellee Natural 
Anonymous Rights Foundation provides as follows: 
(a) There have been no previous appeals in this case. 
(b) It is aware of no other case that will directly affect or 
be directly affected by the Court’s decision in this 
case.  
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1338(a). This Court has jurisdiction over ABC Laboratories, 
Inc.’s (“ABC”) timely appeal from a final judgment pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1295.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES  
1. Did the district court correctly deny ABC’s motion to 
remand where ABC’s breach of license claim necessarily 
raises the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity, which are 
substantial patent issues and capable of federal court 
resolution without disrupting the federal-state balance? 
2. Did the district court correctly invalidate the ‘287 patent 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 where the claimed cDNA sequence 
exists in nature as an identical and active pseudogene and 
the method claim is only an application of a law of nature?       
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
I. ABC Laboratories, Inc. (“ABC”) And The ‘287 Patent 
Masochistic Indomitable Neurotic Drive (“MIND”) Syndrome is 
a rare disease that usually leads to embryonic death shortly 
after conception in mammals. Record Facts at ¶ 1 (hereinafter 
“RF”). In rare cases of survival, “MIND Syndrome causes 
megalomania paired with extreme intelligence, and uncontrollable 
urges to make repeated attempts to take over the world.” Id.   
ABC discovered a genetic sequence associated with MIND 
 2 
Syndrome. Id. ABC filed a patent application with the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) shortly after making 
the discovery. Id. at ¶ 2. The PTO then issued U.S. Patent No. 
8,000,287 (“the ‘287 patent”) to the private institution.   
  The ‘287 patent teaches that DNA molecules exist in every 
human cell and encode a person’s entire genome. Id. The DNA 
double helix contains “crossbars,” which consist of two 
chemically joined nucleotides. Id. DNA nucleotide sequences 
encode information for making amino acids, which are the 
building blocks for proteins. Id. The patent also teaches that 
different portions of a DNA strand encode for different genetic 
traits. Id. at ¶ 3. These different portions, or sequences of 
nucleotides, are “genes.” Id. Not every nucleotide within a gene 
codes for proteins, however. Id. The protein coding sequences 
are “exons,” and the non-coding sequences are “introns.” Id.   
 The broadest claim of the ‘287 patent claims “[a]n isolated 
cDNA associated with [MIND] Syndrome, wherein the cDNA has the 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ. ID NO:1.” Id. at ¶ 4. The 
claimed cDNA sequence contains only the coding exons without the 
non-coding introns. Id. ABC isolated the claimed sequence from 
the genomic PNKY gene found in human embryos carrying the 
syndrome. Id. at ¶ 5. ABC isolated the sequence by reverse 
transcription of the mRNA molecules that create the proteins 
associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 6. ABC used well-known 
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techniques to make its discovery. Id.  
 The ‘287 patent also discloses and claims a method to 
screen embryos using the claimed sequence. Id. at ¶ 9. The 
method consists of extracting an embryo’s PNKY gene and 
comparing it to the claimed sequence. Id. Geneticists and 
fertilization technicians can then determine if the embryo’s 
PNKY gene includes the claimed sequence associated with MIND 
Syndrome. Id. Specifically, the ‘287 patent claims:  
     10.  A method for screening human embryos for a PNKY 
gene associated with [MIND] Syndrome in an embryo, the 
steps of the method comprising:  
comparing a first sequence of a PNKY gene 
extracted from the embryo with a second sequence of a 
PNKY gene set forth in SEQ. ID NO. 1; and  
segregating the embryo if the comparing shows 
that the first sequence includes all components of the 
second sequence.  
  
Id. ABC developed and marketed a screening test based on this 
method in May 2004. Id.   
II. The Natural Anonymous Rights Foundation (“NARF”) 
NARF is a non-governmental organization. RF at ¶ 10. 
Shortly after ABC made its discovery, NARF-sponsored scientists 
at Ramblin State University (“the RSU scientists”) discovered a 
genetic sequence associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. The RSU 
scientists discovered the sequence by isolating DNA mutations 
unique to human adults that experienced MIND symptoms. Id. The 
studied adults had the exact sequence that ABC disclosed and 
claimed in the ‘287 patent. Id. at ¶ 11. The sequence was also 
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in the same PNKY gene from which ABC isolated the claimed 
sequence. Id. The sequence the RSU scientists discovered 
contains only the exons that code for the same proteins as the 
sequence ABC discovered and claimed in its patent. Id. at ¶ 15.     
Moreover, the RSU scientists concluded the sequence arose 
in the studied adults as a processed pseudogene because the 
sequence had no introns. Id. at ¶ 11. Processed pseudogenes are 
DNA sequences that derive from the same process lab technicians 
use to create cDNA. Id. at ¶ 12. These processed pseudogenes are 
“naturally occurring cDNA strands in the human genome that are 
structurally, functionally, and chemically identical to cDNA” 
created in the laboratory. Id. Scientists believe pseudogenes 
form when a naturally occurring virus reverse transcribes the 
mRNA associated with the pseudogene. Id. Even though most 
pseudogenes are non-functional, the RSU scientists determined 
the pseudogene they discovered is active and creates the 
proteins that cause MIND Syndrome in adults. Id. at ¶ 13.  
The RSU scientists then created a screening test based on 
this pseudogene. Id. at ¶ 16. The test identifies embryonic and 
adult versions of MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 17. NARF made this 
test available to fertilization clinics and embryonic testing 
suppliers beginning in October 2004. Id. at ¶ 16.   
III. The License Agreement And Subsequent Dispute 
After the PTO issued the ‘287 patent, ABC sent demand 
 5 
letters to fertilization clinics, end users, and embryonic 
testing suppliers that used NARF’s test. RF at ¶ 18. In the 
letters, ABC threatened to sue users of NARF’s screening test 
for infringing the ‘287 patent. Id. ABC and NARF then entered 
into a license agreement, allowing NARF to continue distributing 
its test, id., in exchange for royalties. Id. at ¶ 19.  
The license defines the “Licensed Product” as “any test 
covered by a claim of the [‘287] Patent.” Id. at ¶ 18. The 
license also states the term of the agreement is tied to the 
validity of the ‘287 patent. Id. The term clause states: 
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect 
for the complete term of the [‘287] Patent unless (i) 
all claims of the [‘287] Patent are held invalid or 
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, in 
which case the term of this agreement shall end upon 
the date all appeals from which any corresponding 
order or judgment have been exhausted, or (ii) either 
party breaches any provision of this agreement. In the 
event the [‘287] Patent is held invalid or 
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, no 
royalties will be owed under this license.   
  
Id. The agreement covers the fertilization clinics, end users, 
and embryonic testing suppliers that use NARF’s test. Id.   
In 2010, NARF sought permission from ABC to use the test 
royalty-free to conduct research on adults. Id. at ¶ 23. ABC 
refused. Id. Nevertheless, in mid-2011, NARF began offering free 
MIND Syndrome screenings to NARF members. Id. at ¶ 24. NARF paid 
no royalties to ABC for these screenings. Id.  
ABC subsequently sued NARF in Ramblin state court in 
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December 2011, claiming NARF breached the license agreement. Id. 
at ¶ 25. NARF answered by claiming the ‘287 patent is invalid 
and that claim 10 of the ‘287 patent covers only embryonic 
testing. Id. NARF then removed to the United States District 
Court for the District of Ramblin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 
Id. NARF also filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim, seeking 
a declaration that the ‘287 patent is invalid. Id.  
ABC timely filed a motion to remand. Id. at ¶ 26. In 
support of its opposition to ABC’s motion, NARF submitted a 
declaration by Professor Elle Vira. Id. The declaration states 
that “nearly [fifty] patent applications [are] pending at the 
USPTO, which relate to patents for cDNA where the differences 
between cDNA and gDNA are minimal or nonexistent.” Id.  
IV. The District Court Denies ABC’s Motion To Remand And 
Rules The ‘287 Patent Is Invalid As A Matter Of Law  
 
The district court denied ABC’s motion to remand and 
granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment, invalidating the 
‘287 patent. Conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 1, 4 (hereinafter “CL”). 
In ruling the court had subject matter jurisdiction, the court 
recognized that ABC’s breach of license claim does not directly 
arise under the patent law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id. 
at ¶ 1. But the court relied on Supreme Court precedent and 
ruled ABC’s “breach of license claim necessarily required the 
court to decide unsettled issues of patent law, which establish 
 7 
them as substantial federal issues.” Id. at ¶ 3. 
In ruling the ‘287 patent invalid, the court recognized 
that non-naturally occurring cDNA is patentable. Id. at ¶ 4. But 
the court ruled the ‘287 patent lacked patent eligible subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the DNA sequence claimed 
in the ‘287 patent was naturally occurring and known to cause 
the claimed symptoms in at least some individuals afflicted with 
MIND Syndrome.” Id. at ¶ 5. ABC appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.   
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling 
because the district court correctly (1) exercised arising under 
jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) and (2) invalidated the ‘287 patent’s composition and 
method claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
First, the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction 
because ABC’s claim satisfies the Grable test. ABC’s claim 
necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s scope because a court must 
interpret the patent to determine whether NARF’s test falls 
within the patent’s scope. A court must also evaluate the ‘287 
patent’s validity because the enforceability of the license 
depends on the ‘287 patent’s validity. The parties dispute both 
issues because the issues are dispositive of this case. The 
issues are also substantial to the entire patent system because 
they present a novel patent issue that will affect the numerous 
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patent applications pending at the PTO. Finally, exercising 
jurisdiction will not disrupt the federal-state court balance 
because Grable’s high bar ensures that only certain contract 
claims arise under the patent law. Thus, this Court should 
affirm the district court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand.  
Second, the district court correctly applied the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. to invalidate the ‘287 patent. Under § 101 of the 
Patent Act, products of nature are not patent eligible but 
products of human ingenuity are. Here, the ‘287 patent’s cDNA 
claim is identical to naturally occurring genomic DNA. While a 
rare exception, the claimed cDNA is a product of nature and not 
patent eligible. In addition, ABC’s method claim is not patent 
eligible under § 101 because the claim is drawn to patent 
ineligible cDNA. The step comparing the cDNA sequence to a test 
subject does not sufficiently transform the application of a 
known law of nature into a patent eligible method. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm the district court’s grant of NARF’s 
motion for summary judgment, invalidating the ‘287 patent.  
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) is an issue of law this Court reviews de novo. In re 
Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
This Court also reviews a district court’s grant of summary 
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judgment de novo. Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc., 
289 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, this Court 
reviews factual findings for clear error. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
ARGUMENT 
 This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling 
because the district court correctly (1) exercised subject 
matter jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and (2) invalidated the ‘287 patent’s 
composition and method claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.   
I. The District Court Correctly Denied ABC’s Motion To Remand 
Because ABC’s Breach Of License Claim Necessarily Depends 
On Resolution Of A Substantial Question Of Patent Law.   
 
The district court correctly denied ABC Laboratories, 
Inc.’s (“ABC”) motion to remand and exercised arising under 
jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim. Congress 
granted federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over “any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). As with general arising under 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal patent jurisdiction 
exists only when the face of the plaintiff’s well pled complaint 
presents a patent law question. Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). Patent defenses, 
however, cannot create federal patent jurisdiction. Id. at 809.  
In 2011, Congress amended the Patent Act to extend federal 
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jurisdiction over counterclaims arising under the patent law. 
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 1129-29, § 19(a), 
125 Stat. 284, 331 (2011); see also Univ. of Ky. Research 
Found., Inc. v. Niadyne, Inc., No. 13–16–GFVT, 2013 WL 5943921, 
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 5, 2013) (noting the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act allows “counterclaims arising under federal patent 
law to provide grounds for federal removal jurisdiction”). These 
amendments abrogated Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002), where the 
Supreme Court held patent law counterclaims cannot create patent 
jurisdiction. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a 
Federal Court, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1791, 1808 & n.86 (2013).    
Generally, a case may arise under the patent law in two 
ways. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013). First, the 
most direct path is when patent law creates the cause of action. 
Id. Patent law, however, does not create ABC’s cause of action. 
Second, in a “special and small category” of cases, Empire 
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 
(2006), a federal court may exercise arising under jurisdiction 
over a state claim if a federal issue is “(1) necessarily 
raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable 
of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-
state balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 
(hereinafter “Grable test”) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 
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Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).  
Here, the district court correctly applied the Grable test 
and exercised arising under jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of 
license claim because federal patent issues are (A) necessarily 
raised, (B) actually disputed, (C) substantial, and (D) capable 
of federal court resolution without disrupting the federal-state 
court division of labor. Thus, this Court should affirm the 
district court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand.    
A. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Necessary 
Elements Of ABC’s Breach Of License Claim.  
 
ABC’s claim necessarily raises federal patent law issues. A 
state claim necessarily raises a federal issue when federal law 
is an essential element of the claim. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315. 
Here, federal patent issues are essential to ABC’s claim because 
(1) interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope determines whether 
the Natural Anonymous Rights Foundation (“NARF”) breached the 
license, and (2) the license agreement’s enforceability depends 
on the ‘287 patent’s validity.        
First, ABC’s claim necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s 
scope. In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, patent jurisdiction existed 
because patent law was a necessary element of the breach of 
license claim. 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). There, the 
licensee claimed the patentee-licensor sold products covered by 
the licensed patents in contravention of the license agreement. 
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Id. To prove this claim, the licensee had to show the licensed 
patents covered the products the licensor sold. Id. Thus, a 
court had to interpret the patents and determine whether the 
products the licensor sold infringed those patents. Id.   
Similarly, the license between ABC and NARF covers “any 
test covered by a claim of the [‘287] Patent.” RF at ¶ 18. To 
determine whether NARF breached the license by offering adult 
MIND Syndrome screenings without paying royalties, id. at ¶ 24, 
a court must interpret and define the ‘287 patent’s parameters 
to determine whether NARF’s test infringes and falls within the 
‘287 patent’s scope. Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s scope is an 
essential element of ABC’s breach of license claim.    
Second, ABC’s claim necessarily raises the ‘287 patent’s 
validity because the term of the license is tied to the ‘287 
patent’s validity. Id. at ¶ 18. The existence of a valid, and 
thus enforceable, contract is one of the elements of a breach of 
contract claim. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Here, ABC and NARF 
contracted around the presumption that issued patents are valid, 
Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 
2013), and agreed at arm’s length that the enforceability of the 
license shall depend on the ‘287 patent’s validity. RF at ¶ 18. 
Accordingly, the ‘287 patent’s validity is a necessary element 
of ABC’s claim because ABC must establish the validity of the 
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‘287 patent in order to prove the existence of a valid and 
enforceable license. Accordingly, ABC’s breach of license claim 
necessarily raises federal patent issues.  
B. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Actually 
Disputed Because Both Issues Are Dispositive Of ABC’s 
Breach Of License Claim.  
  
ABC and NARF actually dispute federal patent issues. A 
federal issue is actually disputed when it is significant to the 
parties and affects the case’s merits. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. 
Ct. 1059, 1065–66 (2013). Here, ABC and NARF actually dispute 
the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity because both issues are 
dispositive of ABC’s breach of license claim.  
In Gunn, the parties actually disputed a federal patent 
issue. Id. at 1065. There, the dispositive issue of the legal 
malpractice suit was whether the experimental-use exception to 
the on-sale bar to patentability would have applied in the 
underlying patent infringement litigation. Id. Thus, application 
of patent law was outcome determinative of the state law claim.   
Similarly, ABC and NARF actually dispute two patent issues. 
First, to determine whether NARF breached the license, a court 
must determine whether NARF’s adult screening test falls within 
the scope of the ‘287 patent. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372. 
This requires a court to interpret the ‘287 patent and determine 
whether NARF’s adult test infringes the patent. Id. If NARF’s 
adult screening test is not within the scope of claim 10 of the 
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‘287 patent, RF at ¶ 9 (claiming a “method for screening human 
embryos for a PNKY gene associated with” MIND Syndrome), then 
NARF has not breached the license and owes no royalties under 
the agreement. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372. Therefore, the 
‘287 patent’s scope is outcome determinative of ABC’s claim.  
Second, the ‘287 patent’s validity is also dispositive of 
ABC’s claim because the license’s term is tied to the patent’s 
validity. RF at ¶ 18. In other words, the enforceability of the 
license depends on the ‘287 patent’s validity. See id. If the 
‘287 patent is invalid, then the license is terminated and 
unenforceable. Accordingly, ABC and NARF actually dispute the 
‘287 patent’s scope and validity.  
C. The ‘287 Patent’s Scope And Validity Are Substantial 
Federal Patent Issues Because Numerous Related Patent 
Applications Are Pending At The USPTO. 
 
The ‘287 patent’s scope and validity are substantial patent 
issues. A federal issue is substantial when it is “significant 
to the federal system as a whole.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068. 
ABC’s claim presents substantial patent issues because (1) a 
judicial interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity 
will affect these parties, the PTO, and the numerous patent 
applications pending at the PTO; (2) resolution of these issues 
will have preclusive effects; and (3) federal court resolution 
of these issues promotes the patent law’s uniformity.  
First, an interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and 
 15 
validity will affect these parties, the PTO, and the numerous 
patent applications pending at the PTO. In Gunn, the legal 
malpractice claim’s patent issue was not a substantial federal 
issue. Id. at 1066. The patent issue—the experimental-use 
exception’s applicability in the prior patent infringement 
litigation—was “hypothetical” in light of the backward-looking 
nature of legal malpractice claims. Id. at 1067. No matter how 
the state court resolved the hypothetical “case within a case,” 
it would not alter the fact a federal court invalidated the 
patentee’s patent in the “real-world” patent litigation. Id.    
Unlike Gunn, the ‘287 patent is not a hypothetical patent 
because a judicial interpretation of the ‘287 patent will affect 
the patent and patent law. In fact, resolution of ABC’s claim 
requires a court to actually—not hypothetically—determine the 
‘287 patent’s scope and validity. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings 
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(declaring a state claim may arise under the patent law if the 
claim requires proving the patent’s validity). 
Rather, this case is like Grable where the meaning of a 
federal tax statute was a substantial federal issue. 545 U.S. at 
315. There, the Court focused on the broader significance of the 
question and the Federal Government’s “strong interest” in being 
able to collect taxes. Id. The IRS also had a “direct interest” 
in vindicating its administrative action in a federal forum. Id.     
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Similarly, an interpretation of the ‘287 patent will affect 
the PTO and other parties. Like the IRS in Grable, the PTO has a 
direct interest in vindicating its decision to issue the ‘287 
patent in a federal forum before judges versed in patent law. 
See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315; see also Air Measurement Techs., 
Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 
1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting the federal interest in resolving 
patent issues in federal court because a federal agency issues 
patents and federal judges have experience in claim construction 
and infringement matters). The fact that there are nearly fifty 
patent applications pending at the PTO that relate to patents 
for cDNA where “the differences between cDNA and [genomic DNA] 
are minimal or nonexistent” supports this interest. RF at ¶ 26. 
Thus, a court’s interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope and 
validity will affect not only ABC and NARF, but also the PTO and 
the numerous patent applications pending at the PTO.  
Second, a court’s interpretation of the ‘287 patent’s scope 
and validity will have preclusive effects. In Gunn, the asserted 
patent issue was not novel such that its resolution “would be 
controlling in numerous other cases.” 133 S. Ct. at 1067. The 
Court also concluded that permitting state courts to adjudicate 
hypothetical patent issues would not undermine the uniformity of 
patent law because “federal courts are . . . not bound by state 
court case-within-a-case patent rulings.” Id. Therefore, the 
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possibility that a state court would incorrectly handle a state 
claim was not, without more, enough to give rise to the federal 
courts’ exclusive patent jurisdiction. Id. at 1068.     
Unlike the hypothetical issue in Gunn, the subject matter 
eligibility of the ‘287 patent is a novel issue of patent law. 
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the patentability of 
cDNA, the Court overlooked the situation presented here. See 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107, 2119 & n.8 (2013). As discussed below, see infra Part 
II, the Court overlooked the possibility that an active and 
identical pseudogene could exist in nature as genomic DNA. See 
id. Resolution of this pure, novel patent issue will control 
numerous other cases, see Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067, because 
ABC’s claim requires a court to determine the parameters of 35 
U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, ABC’s state claim arises under the 
patent law because ABC’s right to relief “will be defeated by 
one construction or sustained by the opposite construction of 
[the patent] laws”. Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge 
Co., 185 U.S. 282, 286 (1902). 
Additionally, allowing a state court to decide this novel 
patent issue may have preclusive effects on these litigants and 
federal courts. The full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 
applies to federal courts even when a state court “judgment 
turn[s] on construction of subject matter within the exclusive 
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.” MGA, Inc. v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 732 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971) (holding a patentee may be estopped from asserting the 
validity of a patent that was declared invalid in a prior suit 
against a different defendant). Thus, if a state court concludes 
that NARF’s adult test does not fall within the ‘287 patent’s 
scope or invalidates the ‘287 patent, then ABC could not bring a 
subsequent infringement suit against NARF’s customers for using 
the same test. See MGA, Inc., 827 F.2d at 731, 734 (estopping 
the patentee from bringing a patent infringement suit against 
the licensee’s customer in federal court after a state court 
determined the licensee did not breach the license because the 
accused machine did not fall within the patent’s scope). Thus, a 
federal judge versed in patent law should hear this case because 
its resolution will have preclusive effects.  
Third, federal court resolution of the ‘287 patent’s scope 
and validity promotes the patent law’s uniformity. In Gunn, the 
Court held state court adjudication of hypothetical patent 
issues would not undermine the patent law’s uniformity. 133 S. 
Ct. at 1067. That is not the case here because a state court 
determination will have preclusive effects. See MGA, Inc., 827 
F.2d at 732. But requiring a federal court to resolve these 
patent issues of first impression will promote “the development 
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of a uniform body of [patent] law.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989). Indeed, 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases “to 
reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of 
legal doctrine that exist[ed] in the administration of patent 
law.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
813 (1988). Accordingly, a federal court should adjudicate this 
case to maintain uniformity in the patent law. 
In sum, resolution of the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity 
will affect numerous other parties and have preclusive effects. 
Also, federal adjudication of this case promotes patent law’s 
uniformity. Thus, this case presents significant patent issues. 
D. Resolving ABC’s Breach Of License Claim In Federal 
Court Will Not Disrupt The Congressionally Approved 
Federal-State Court Balance. 
 
Federal court resolution of these patent issues will not 
disrupt the federal-state court balance. A federal court may 
exercise patent jurisdiction over a state claim if a federal 
court can resolve the claim without disrupting the federal-state 
court balance. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013). 
This inquiry focuses on the appropriate “balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, and 
recognizes that some state claims “justify resort to the 
experience . . . [and] uniformity that a federal forum offers.” 
Id. at 312. Exercising jurisdiction over this case is proper 
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because (1) the Grable test’s high bar limits what state claims 
arise under the patent law, (2) only rare contract cases present 
novel patent issues, and (3) exercising jurisdiction will not 
disrupt the states’ interest because Grable contemplates that 
some traditional state claims will arise under federal law.  
In Grable, the Court held exercising jurisdiction to 
determine a federal statute’s meaning would have a “microscopic 
effect on the federal-state division of labor” because only 
“rare state title case[s]” raise contested federal issues. Id. 
at 315. Similarly, exercising jurisdiction over this case will 
not cause contract cases to flood federal district courts.   
First, a party asserting that a state claim arises under 
the patent law must satisfy the other three prongs of the Grable 
test. This limits the cases that arise under the patent law 
because the patent issue must not only be raised and disputed, 
but also substantial to the federal system. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 
1066. This substantiality prong ensures that not all breach of 
patent license claims arise under the patent law.  
Second, only rare contract cases present novel patent 
issues that will control other cases. These rare cases belong in 
federal court because federal court resolution of novel patent 
issues furthers Congress’s intent to have a predictable and 
uniform patent law. See DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, 
Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Indeed, Congress 
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granted federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
arising under patent law to ensure uniformity in the patent law. 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1295. Here, ABC’s claim presents the novel 
issue of whether cDNA is patent eligible when an active and 
identical pseudogene exists in nature. RF at ¶¶ 11–15. Thus, the 
fact that ABC’s claim involves a novel issue ensures that only 
rare breach of license claims will arise under the patent law.  
Third, although states have an interest in developing their 
own body of contract law, see Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 
U.S. 109, 114–15 (1936), Grable contemplates that some state 
claims will arise under the patent law when the claim depends on 
a substantial patent issue. See 545 U.S. at 314. Otherwise, 
fifty state court systems could make different rulings regarding 
the subject matter eligibility of a class of patents. Congress 
did not intend this when it enacted §§ 1338 and 1295.   
In sum, ABC’s breach of license claim arises under the 
federal patent law. Specifically, the ‘287 patent’s scope and 
validity are essential elements and dispositive of ABC’s claim. 
These issues are also significant to the federal system because 
their resolution affects more than just ABC and NARF. Finally, 
federal court adjudication of ABC’s breach of license claim 
comports with the congressionally approved federal-state court 
balance. Thus, this Court should affirm the district court’s 
denial of ABC’s motion to remand.  
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II. The Claims In ABC’s ‘287 Patent Are Invalid Under § 101 
Because They Are Drawn To Patent Ineligible Subject Matter. 
 
The district court correctly invalidated the ‘287 patent 
for lack of patentable subject matter. “Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful . . . composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent.” 35 
U.S.C. § 101. But laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). These 
exceptions prevent inventors from patenting the tools of science 
and “inhibit[ing] future innovation premised upon them.” Id. at 
1301. For example, mental processes, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67 (1972), and products of nature, such as metals, Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 642 (3d Cir. 
1928), and bacteria, Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948), are patent ineligible under § 101.  
In Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
the Supreme Court held isolated genomic DNA is not patent 
eligible subject matter because it is a product of nature. 133 
S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). The Court’s holding relied in part on 
the distinction between Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. 
See id. at 2116–17. In Chakrabarty, the claimed subject matter 
was a strain of bacteria the inventor genetically modified to 
break down crude oil. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 
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(1980). The Court held the bacterium patent eligible because the 
manmade bacterium was “markedly different” from any naturally 
occurring bacterium. Id. at 309–10.   
In Funk Bros., however, the Court held a new combination of 
unaltered, naturally occurring bacteria patent ineligible. 333 
U.S. at 130. The Court recognized that “[h]e who discovers a[n] 
. . . unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of 
it which the law recognizes.” Id. Following these precedents, 
the AMP Court held genomic DNA “isolated from the surrounding 
genetic material” patent ineligible. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. Synthetically prepared cDNA, 
however, is a product of human ingenuity not found in nature. 
Id. at 2119. Therefore, cDNA is patent eligible. Id.   
Despite the Court’s holding that cDNA is patent eligibile, 
all of ABC’s claims are invalid because (A) the cDNA claimed in 
the ‘287 patent is a product of nature and (B) the method claim 
covers only nonpatentable abstract ideas. 
A. The ‘287 Patent’s cDNA Claim Is Ineligible Subject 
Matter Because It Is A Product Of Nature. 
 
The ‘287 patent’s cDNA claim is invalid for lack of 
patentable subject matter because the cDNA is a product of 
nature. Although the Court held Myriad’s cDNA claims patentable, 
the Court defined when cDNA is and is not patentable. See Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 & n.8.   
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In AMP, the Court addressed the patentability of Myriad’s 
claims to the BRCA genes. Id. at 2112. The claims were drawn to 
segments of DNA isolated from their surroundings, retaining 
their entire natural genetic sequence. Id. at 2113. The Court 
held these claims were drawn to patent ineligible products of 
nature. Id. at 2111. But the claimed cDNA versions of those 
genes were valid. Id. at 2119. Specifically, the Court held cDNA 
is a patentable “product of man” because it is “something new” 
and “distinct from the DNA from which it was derived.” Id. Even 
though nature dictates the cDNA sequence, the “lab technician 
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” Id. 
Thus, the Court premised its narrow holding on the principle 
that cDNA is patent eligible because it contains only exons and 
is distinct from the natural material. See id.    
The Court also appreciated that cDNA patent eligibility is 
not so clear. Id. at 2119 n.8. Footnote eight states that in 
rare cases, viral infection of a cell may incorporate processed 
pseudogenes into the host DNA. Id. Pseudogenes are composed of 
intron-free cDNA. Id. The Court noted that in some situations, a 
“rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule similar to one 
created synthetically through human ingenuity.” Id. According to 
the Court, this possibility does not render a composition of 
matter nonpatentable. Id.   
This ambiguity and its importance to this case necessitates 
 25 
further discussion because 1) the Court intended the product of 
nature doctrine to trump the product of man doctrine and 2) this 
case presents an exception to the rule that cDNA is patentable. 
1) cDNA Is Patent Eligible Except When The cDNA Is 
Demonstrably A Product of Nature. 
 
 The Court focused on the manmade nature of the cDNA when it 
held Myriad’s cDNA claims valid because it was “distinct from” 
the genomic DNA from which it derived. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119. To ensure consistent application 
of the product of man doctrine, the Court addressed the rare 
possibility of cDNA existing in nature. Id. at 2119 n.8.   
The Court stated the possibility that a synthetic molecule 
exists randomly in nature “does not render a composition of 
matter nonpatentable.” Id. This statement allows the PTO to 
issue patents where the claimed subject matter’s natural 
existence is unknown. It also permits courts to invalidate 
patents when later discovery demonstrates the claimed invention 
exists in nature. For example, the discovery of a naturally 
produced chemical would invalidate a patent claiming a manmade 
version of the chemical. 
The Court also endorsed Judge Bryson’s observation that the 
challenger “failed to demonstrate that the pseudogene consists 
of the same sequence as the BRCA1 cDNA.” Id. (quoting Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
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1303, 1356 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). Thus, the challenger failed to show 
the claimed cDNA was a naturally occurring pseudogene rather 
than a synthetically created product. Id. The Court’s adoption 
of this observation reiterates the rule that a party claiming 
invalidity must show the claimed invention is identical to a 
natural product. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
Accordingly, a patent claiming a synthetically created 
product is invalid if research shows that the claimed subject 
matter exists in nature. This outcome allows for consistent 
application of the product of man doctrine and comports with the 
principles underlying the patent law. Specifically, the patent 
law recognizes that “extensive effort alone is insufficient to 
satisfy the demands of § 101.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 
133 S. Ct. at 2118. Rather, the inventor must create “something 
new.” Id. at 2119; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that an 
inventor must invent something “new and useful” to receive a 
patent). Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s cDNA claim is a product of 
nature, not a new product of human ingenuity.     
2) This Case Presents An Exception To The Rule That 
cDNA Is Distinct from Its Original DNA. 
 
The cDNA discovered and claimed by ABC is not patent 
eligible under § 101 because it is a naturally occurring product 
of nature. The DNA that NARF isolated is identical to the cDNA 
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that ABC claimed. RF at ¶ 12. Both genetic sequences are 
identical, intron-free, and actively code for the MIND Syndrome 
proteins. See id. at ¶¶ 10–15. All ABC created was an identical 
copy of the naturally occurring sequence, possibly without even 
realizing it. But knowledge of that fact is not relevant to the 
patentability inquiry. Thus, ABC’s cDNA claim is invalid because 
the claimed cDNA is not a product of human ingenuity. Rather, 
the claimed cDNA is a patent ineligible product of nature.       
B. ABC’s Method Claim Is Invalid Because The Claim Covers 
Well Understood Tools Of Science And Abstract Ideas. 
 
The ‘287 patent’s method claim is invalid because the claim 
does not transform the ineligible composition into a patentable 
process. Method claims are patent eligible if they “transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of 
such a law, [but] one must do more than simply state the law . . 
. while adding the words ‘apply it.’” Mayo Collaborative Servs. 
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).  
In Parker v. Flook, the Court considered a method of 
updating alarm limits. 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). The Court held 
that no inventive concept supported the patent because the only 
novel feature of the method was the application of an algorithm 
to an otherwise conventional process. Id. at 585, 590. 
In Diamond v. Diehr, however, the Court held a method 
applying the Arrhenius equation to a process for curing rubber 
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patent eligible. 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). Although the process 
applied a known mathematical equation, the method did not seek 
to preclude its use. Id. at 187. Rather, the method integrated 
the equation into the process as a whole, transforming the claim 
into a different, patent eligible state. Id. at 187, 192.   
The Court applied these precedents in Bilski v. Kappos to 
invalidate a claimed business method. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 
(2010). While the Court did not preclude the patentability of 
business methods, it held that allowing a patent for hedging 
risk would “pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and 
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.” Id.  
In Mayo, the Court held the claimed method did not 
sufficiently transform the application of known laws of nature 
into a patentable method. 132 S. Ct. at 1298. There, the method 
claimed steps of administering a known drug, ascertaining a 
known metabolite’s concentrations, and using that information to 
modify the treatment. See id. at 1296–98. The Court determined 
these steps were nothing more than instructions to a physician 
on the routine practice of medicine. Id. at 1298.   
In AMP, this Court applied Mayo and held comparing two 
genetic sequences “can be accomplished by mere inspection 
alone.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
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Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). There, the claims 
recited a screening method of comparing a known gene to the test 
sample and observing the differences. Id. at 1334. This Court 
held claims to “‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ two gene sequences 
fall outside the scope of § 101 because they claim only abstract 
mental processes.” Id. Accordingly, Myriad’s method claims of 
comparing and analyzing were not sufficiently transformative of 
“what was otherwise a claim to a natural law.” Id. at 1335. 
Myriad’s method claims were “only directed to the abstract 
mental process.” Id. Therefore, Myriad’s method claims to the 
application of isolated BRCA genes were invalid. Id. 
Most recently, Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 
applied this line of cases to invalidate method claims related 
to fetal DNA. No. C 11–06391 SI, 2013 WL 5863022, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct 30, 2013). There, the claims detected fetal DNA, 
amplified it, and ran diagnostic tests on that DNA. Id. at *1–2. 
Because “the only inventive concept contained in the patent 
[was] the discovery of [naturally occurring] cffDNA,” the court 
followed Mayo to invalidate the patent. Id. at *9. 
ABC’s method claim falls within the framework of patent 
ineligible methods. The ‘287 patent teaches that by extracting 
and comparing an embryo’s PNKY gene to the claimed sequence, 
technicians can determine whether the embryo includes the MIND 
Syndrome sequence. RF at ¶ 9. As in AMP, the only claimed step 
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is to “compare” the two sequences. Id. Without more, the method 
claim does not transform the nonpatentable DNA sequence into a 
patentable application. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 
1294. As discussed above, comparison of nucleotide sequences is 
not a patent eligible application of a law of nature. ABC’s 
claim does not contain any additional features that “provide 
practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting 
effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” Id. at 
1297. Therefore, the ‘287 patent’s method claim is invalid.  
In sum, the ‘287 patent’s composition and method claims are 
patent ineligible. The district court correctly invalidated 
ABC’s patent and granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should AFFIRM the lower 
court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand and grant of NARF’s 
motion for summary judgment to invalidate the ‘287 patent.   
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